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ABSTRACT. 
The neo-liberal and export-led growth model has proved to meet its limitations in the past two 
decades and the Korean model has to change into an alternative model based on wage and 
welfare-led growth. The goal of this paper is to propose the direction of tax reform which can 
support that change. In effect, the tax system has been a vehemently debaded issue in the past 
years since the previous government implemented the smaller government and tax cut policy. 
In order to propose a desirable tax system, this paper examines the limitation of the current 
growth model, traces the evolution of the Korean tax system from the industrialization period, 
and compares it and those of other OECD countries. Based on this work we argue that a reform 
of the tax system should start by increasing taxes more than social insurance and 
strengthening the role of direct taxes in a way to increase progressivity and the tax revenue of 
direct taxes at the same time. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Korean economy is now at a crossroad between the old export-led model and a new 
welfare-based one. Good performance in the exporting sector stopped spilling over into other 
sectors, leading to economic polarization and acute inequality. Being aware of the serious inequality 
problem, both the conservative and progressive parties put forward “economic democratization” 
and “welfare expansion” as their main agenda in the past general and presidential elections in 2012. 
The winning conservative party, however, has been troubling in that it keeping its promise of 
welfare expansion due to its obstinate belief in the benefit of tax cut policies and the validity of the 
neo-liberal, export-led growth model. Nonetheless, this growth model has proved to be limited 
and the wage increase and welfare expansion policy has gained popularity as an alternative focusing 
on domestic demand.  
How should the tax system be reformed to be complementary to the transformation of the 
Korean economy to a welfare-led growth model? Historically, the Korean tax system has been 
designed to serve mainly the promotion of economic growth. During the economic take-off of 
1960’s and 1970’s, tax incentives were widely given to businesses and high income earners for the 
promotion of investment, exports, and capital accumulation. The VAT introduced in 1977 was the 
main sources of tax revenue for the industrialization period. The role of direct taxes started to 
increase from the middle of 1980’s with political democratization. After the financial crisis of 1997, 
the Korean fiscal system started to change with rapidly increasing welfare expenditure, which meant 
a change in the tax system as well. However, the level of welfare expenditure is still very low 
compared to the OECD average.  
The goal of this paper is to propose the direction of tax reform which is supportive of the 
establishment of a welfare-led economic model. Which tax item is the best candidate? Contrary to 
the general expectation that a country with a higher welfare expenditure would rely more on 
progressive tax, recent studies have argued that the regressive tax intensified the country's tax 
collection capability, contributing to the expansion of the welfare-state (Steinmo, 2003; Kato, 2003). 
If Korea would like to transform into a welfare-led growth model, should it be financed more by 
regressive indirect taxes following their experiences? We do not think so. A wage and welfare-led 
model should be sought together with tax fairness in order to maximize the redistributive impact 
of the fiscal system at least for the time being.  
This paper starts by arguing the need to shift from the neo-liberal and export-led growth model 
to a wage and welfare led growth model in the following section. Next, the fiscal policy of Korea 
will be examined from a historical point of view. In the third section, this work will trace the 
evolution of expenditure and tax systems over a long time and allows for a deeper understanding 
of the Korean fiscal system. The forth section will be dedicated to the comparison between the tax 
systems of Korea and those of OECD countries. This work is expected to shed some light on the 
future direction of tax system reform of Korea. The proposed direction for tax system reform will 
be given in detail in the fifth section.  
 
II. THE KOREAN ECONOMY AT A CROSSROADS 
 
Under a state system pursuing economic development as its raison d’etre, South Korea 
achieved rapid industrialization in a brief period of time. After an outstanding achievement, it 
seemed to transform smoothly into an economy with a more democratic, liberalized, and advanced 
system up until the year 1997. Yet the financial crisis and subsequent neo-liberal reforms have 
changed the Korean economy in a drastic way. Prominent features of the Korean economy after 
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the financial crisis have been low growth, polarization, and high inequality. The polarization 
phenomenon has taken various forms. In industry, the manufacturing sector has enjoyed increasing 
value while the service sector has not. In business size, the gap between large companies and small 
and medium-sized businesses has widened in terms of sales, net profit, and even financial 
soundness such as indebtedness level. In the macro-economy, the export business has exploded 
but domestic demand has not. This polarization is largely due to the fact that a small number of 
top Korean Chaebols have prospered beyond the domestic market and the rest have shown rapidly 
deteriorating performances.  
 
Table 1. Polarization between exports and domestic demand after the crisis (Growth rates of 
macroeconomic expenditure categories) 
 GDP Private 
Consumption 
Government 
Consumption 
Investment Exports Imports 
90-92 8.8 8.5 7.5 13.8 9.9 12.8 
93-95 8.8 9.0 4.7 11.7 17.0 20.1 
96-98 3.9 1.3 3.6 -4.3 15.4 1.1 
99-01 6.9 7.9 4.2 7.1 9.3 11.1 
01-03 3.9 1.4 4.3 3.2 14.1 10.2 
04-06 4.5 3.7 6.2 2.6 10.8 9.1 
07-09 3.6 2.5 3.7 2.2 9.2 8.3 
10-12 3.1 1.9 3.1 3.2 3.6 1.9 
13-14 3.9 1.4 4.3 3.2 14.1 10.2 
Source: Economic Statistics System, Bank of Korea 
 
This means that the export-led model driven by the spearheading Chaebols targeting overseas 
markets is no longer viable. The expected trickle-down effect from exporting Chaebols to the SMEs 
and domestic economy has not been observed. Labor flexibilization has been implemented in order 
to boost the competitiveness of companies, and stimulate investment and employment, but has 
only resulted in the expansion of low-wage and precarious workers. In particular, the service 
industries characterized by SMEs and non-unionized workers suffer low-paid employment and a 
low-productivity problem more severely than manufacturing industries. Manufacturing exporters 
have increased the outsourcing of service-related works, reducing the employment of their own 
regular workers.  
 
Figure 1. Trends in the incidence of low pay in the Republic of Korea, 1986–2010 
(Unit: %) 
 
Source: Hwang and Lee (2012) 
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The number of low-paid and precarious workers has been increasing at an alarming speed. 
The incidence of low-paid workers standing at 29% in 1986 started to rapidly decline in the late 
1980’s on the backdrop of the country's transition to democracy. The political democracy 
strengthened workers' bargaining power and led to the widespread adoption of collective 
bargaining and new policy initiatives such as statutory minimum wages (Hwang and Lee, 2012). 
However, after the outbreak of financial crisis, the government took a dramatic policy shift towards 
deregulation and labor flexibility as a part of drastic reform of economic system and the incidence 
of low pay soared (Figure 1). As a result, the growth in average wages has not kept up with 
productivity growth. 
With the increase in low-paid workers, income distribution has deteriorated, which can be 
measured by three indicators. The first indicator is the decrease of wage share in the functional 
income distribution to the advantage of capital. The adjusted wage share in the total income started 
to decrease after the financial crisis.1 The second indicator is the decrease of household income 
share to the advantage of corporations. This is closely related to the first indicator in that the wage 
is the main component of household income and the profit is the main component of corporate 
income. However, there are some differences between the two indicators. The total income of the 
self-employed is counted as a part of household income in this case and the dividend, a distributed 
profit, belongs to household income also. Figure 2 shows that corporate income had been 5% to 
10% for nearly thirty years and began to rise suddenly from the year of 1999 and reached 20% in 
2010. The concerning phenomenon regarding this trend is that the investment by the corporate 
sector has not been active since the financial crisis despite the increase of their income share. The 
corporate sector has been net lender while the household sector has become a net borrower.2  
 
Figure 2. Ratio of Corporate Income to Household Income in Korea (1975～2010) 
 
Source: Kang and Lee (2013). 
Note: Household income means net disposable income of individuals, and corporate income means net disposable 
income of corporations (financial and non-financial enterprises). 
 
The third indicator of income distribution is the household income distribution. While the 
share of household income has dwindled vis-a-vis corporate income, the household income 
                                                 
1 The income of self-employed should be broken down into a labor and capital incomes. This element plays an important role as the proportion of 
the self-employed in the economic activity in Korea is highly larger than those of other OECD countries, which comprises one of features of 
Korean economy.  
2 It should be notable that cross-company variation in the corporate income is very large. Large corporations show a better performance than SMEs 
in terms of profitability as well as in stability and growth. In addition, even among large corporations big gap exists between top-tier and lower-
tier Chaebols. Four Chaebol groups, Samsung, Hyundai, LG, and SK came to dominate the Korean economy more strongly than before the crisis. 
Ok and Yang (2012) diagnosed that the financial and labor market reforms after 1997 were especially negative economic environments to the 
SMEs. 
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distribution itself has become more unequal. It is mainly because wages have become more 
polarized, with lower-end wages taking an ever-smaller proportion of earned income3. As public 
welfare expenditures have increased since the financial crisis of 1997, the redistributive impact by 
fiscal policy has increased as well. However, the deterioration of market income distribution has 
been too severe to be compensated by redistributive fiscal policy. The Gini coefficient calculated 
with the household disposable income jumped significantly after the year of 1997. One might argue 
that the current level of disposable income distribution is not something to be worried about 
because the official figure of the Gini coefficient is as low as the average of OECD countries. 
However, Kim and Kim (2013) newly estimated the Gini coefficient using the data of the National 
Tax Services and found that the Gini coefficient of disposable income was 0.371 higher than the 
official figure of 0.308 in 2010. Their estimated figure is more reliable because the survey data used 
for the official figure has the problem of under-collecting or largely omitting high income 
households. According to the new figure, Korea was the fifth most unequal country in household 
income distribution.  
On this backdrop, the wage-led growth theory has gained its popularity as an alternative 
growth strategy in Korea.4 Hong (2014) analyzed the relationship between functional income 
distribution and economic growth in Korea from 1981 until 2012. He estimated the effects of 
income distribution on consumption, investment, and net export. Empirical results of the total 
effect on the aggregate demand show that the demand regime in Korea was weakly wage-led in 
1981-1997, and strongly wage-led in 1999-2012. This means that the increase in the wage share can 
boost the economy by stimulating domestic demand.5 An increase of the minimum wage can be a 
good instrument to jump-start the wage-led growth model. However, one problem in this direction 
is that the Korean corporate sector is extremely polarized and there exists huge informal sectors 
where government labor inspection has not reached. If the minimum wage is raised substantially 
at once, the employers in a relatively good condition can comply with it, but struggling marginal 
employers might have to reduce employment or hide the fact of employment. Due to this problem, 
the increase of minimum wage should be carried out in a gradual way, giving the time of adaptation 
to the concerned employers. This means that the welfare expansion will play an important role in 
the wage-led growth model as it can increase the disposable income of low income household 
directly. Although the welfare expenditures of Korea have significantly expanded since the crisis 
of 1997, the level is still very low compared to other OECD countries. Indeed, there is a long way 
to go.  
 
III. KOREAN FISCAL POLICY FROM A HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
 
The fiscal system of Korea is oriented more towards the pursuit of economic growth 
compared to other OECD countries. This type of fiscal system was established in the 
industrialization period and has been maintained despite some minor changes. In 1960’s and 1970’s, 
a large part of the budget was poured into national defense and economic programs. On the tax 
system side, economic development took priority over other goals, such as tax equity or tax fairness. 
While the tax rate structure of individual and corporate income taxes were highly progressive with 
a very high top marginal rate, generous tax exemption measures were provided in order to stimulate 
                                                 
3 This is not only the phenomenon found in Korea. According to Atkinson, Piketty and Saez (2011) income inequality is worse than at any time in 
the 20th century. 
4 Post-Keynesian scholars considered the decrease in the labor share of income triggered income contraction, which led to the decline of growth 
of the whole economy. Based on this diagnosis, they proposed wage-led growth model as an alternative to the neo-liberal model (UNCTAD, 2010; 
Lavoie and Stockhammer, 2010; Stockhammer, 2011; Onaran and Galanis, 2013).  
5 The current government is well aware of the seriousness of the inequality problem, but it tries to push for more of labor flexibility instead of an 
increase in the minimum wage. 
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longer work hours and more investments and exports. While a comprehensive income tax and 
capital gains tax were introduced, they were also given favorable treatment with the aim of 
promoting savings. The amount of tax expenditure reached nearly 40% of total tax revenue in the 
year of 1970. In addition, tax evasion practices were widespread and the real estate tax was levied 
on substantially under-assessed property value. The main revenue generating tax was the indirect 
taxes since the value added tax of 10% was introduced as early as the year of 1977. This type of tax 
system surely favored the exporting big businesses and wealthy households.  
The expenditure and tax structure experienced some changes with the political 
democratization in 1987. The economic democratization was translated into the expansion of 
welfare programs and the change of the tax system into a fairer one. On the welfare side, the 
government launched the National Pension Scheme applied to workplaces with 10 or more full-
time employees and accomplished universal health insurance coverage for all of its citizens, 
introduced in 1977. In that way, social insurances took the central position in the Korean welfare 
system. In the tax system, the share of direct tax started to increase from the middle of 1980’s. 
Although the statutory income tax rates was gradually lowered, the income tax revenue increased 
due to the reduction of tax exemption measures and easier enforcement of wage income tax. 
However, the non-wage income such as financial income and capital gains were not taxed in a fair 
way compared to wage income. Accordingly, the governments seizing power after the 
democratization sought to strengthen taxation on these non-wage incomes. New real estate holding 
taxes and real name financial transaction system were introduced, but these efforts faced a strong 
resistance and could not win a sensible success6.  
 
 
Figure 3. Total and welfare expenditure of the general government of Korea (as percentage of GDP) 
 
 
Source: www.oecd.org/statistics 
 
Since the financial crisis of 1997, Korean fiscal policy has been characterized by increasing 
trends in the total expenditure and the welfare program expenditure (Figure 3). The government 
expenditure itself as a share of GDP has shown the increasing trend since the crisis. In the case of 
welfare programs, it exceeded economic program expenditures in 2003. The welfare system was 
                                                 
6 During industrialization period, the Korean government made efforts to limit the size of the fiscal deficit and succeeded in containing the excessive 
rise of government debt. In the beginning of the years of 1980’s, the new military regime officially adopted a rule of keeping fiscal accounts in 
surplus and a lot of tax exemption measures started to be scrapped with a view to increasing tax revenue. This policy continues to dominate fiscal 
policy these days. 
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improved and expanded during two progressive governments taking power consecutively after the 
crisis. In the DJ government (1998~2002), the social insurance system and the public assistance 
system were substantially improved7. In the consecutive Rho government (2003~2007), social 
welfare services for child care, family, women, and the elderly were improved. In addition, the Roh 
government decided to introduce a Basic Old-Age Pension, Long-Term Care Insurance for the 
Aged, and an Earned-Income Tax Credit for the working poor at the end of its term. However, 
the implementation of these new statutory welfare programs were entrusted to the ensuing 
governments. 
Unlike these two progressive governments, the next two conservative governments have been 
reluctant to expand the welfare programs. The MB government (2008~2012) put forward a 
principle of “Pragmatism in the favor of ordinary people”. However, that principle meant an 
inactive welfare policy. The MB government argued that the best welfare is to provide jobs though 
economic growth which would be possible by smaller government and tax cuts. Despite this 
inactive position, welfare expenditure increased under the MB government as well, mostly because 
the intensified welfare system by previous governments automatically increased the expenditures. 
However, the tax cut policy put downward pressure on the taxing capability of government, which 
led to the contraction of non-statutory welfare programs.  
The tax cut and business friendly economic policy of the MB government did not bring the 
promised growth to Korea. The general and presidential elections held in 2012 were expected to 
be won by opposition party on the backdrop of socio-economic polarization and global financial 
crisis. The main campaign agendas of the opposition party were “economic democracy” and 
“comprehensive welfare”. However, the conservative party and its presidential candidate Park also 
adopted those agendas and modified it into a slogan: “welfare without more taxes". This strategy 
brought the conservative bloc the victory, but created problems in its realization. The Park 
government put the promised welfare programs such as the basic pension and the elementary care 
program program into action but crashed into a financial problem due to the shortage of tax 
revenue.  
 
Figure 4. Tax burden with and without social insurance contributions (as percentage of GDP) 
 
Source: www.oecd.org/statistics 
 
                                                 
7 The Unemployment Insurance, introduced in 1995, was extended to all workplaces in 1998; the National Pension Scheme was extended to the 
self-employed living in urban areas in 1999; and the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance was extended to all workplaces in 1999. 
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Figure 5. Tax revenue structure excluding social insurance contributions (as percentage of GDP) 
 
Source: www.oecd.org/statistics 
 
How was the evolution of tax system after the crisis of 1997? The years just after the crisis 
were a propitious period for making the tax system fairer one. The newly established government 
was expected to implement a long-awaited tax reform, but this expectation was not realized. After 
the outbreak of the financial crisis, the most immediate concern of tax policy was to alleviate the 
adverse effects from the crisis and to promote structural adjustments. The DJ government 
(1998~2002) introduced various tax exemption measures to boost economic activity, facilitate 
restructuring of the corporate and financial sectors, and encourage foreign direct investment and 
capital inflows8. Comprehensive taxation of capital income was suspended in 1999 and 2000 to 
prevent negative impacts on the financial markets, and the personal capital gains tax rate were 
reduced to boost the real estate market. To encourage private consumption, special consumption 
taxes have been have been reduced or eliminated.  
The next Roh government (2003~2008) maintained the same kind of tax policy; that is, the 
reduction of tax rates and the increase of tax deductions9. Instead of the tax cut policy in these 
taxes, the Roh government intensified the taxation on the real estate10. It was based on the diagnosis 
that the capital income increased faster than wage income, which hampered the efficient operation 
of the economy of production. The Comprehensive Real Estate Holding Tax, the flagship 
achievement of the Roh government had an objective of intensifying the taxation on ownership of 
excessive real estate and allocating tax revenue to local governments for balanced growth in local 
economies. However, the tax revenue from the comprehensive property tax was not large and was 
criticized as a tax punishing the rich.  
The MB government (2008~2012) put forward the idea of “Small Government and Tax Cuts” 
as a representative policy. The tax rates of the individual income tax and corporate income tax were 
lowered as in previous governments. In particular, the corporate income tax rates was slashed by 3 
                                                 
8 Wage and salary earners received tax relief in the form of increased deductions and a cut in the marginal tax rates. The tax burden on the self-
employed was reduced by the introduction of a tax credit for formal bookkeeping and expanding the allowances for credit card sales. To stimulate 
investment, tax incentives were provided to small and medium-sized enterprises, including tax exemptions on capital gains and stock options in 
venture capital businesses.  
9 Sung (2011) examined the redistributive effects of income taxes of the governments from 1992 to 2007 and concluded that they were characterized 
by decreasing redistributive effects because the provision of generous tax relief was more beneficial to high income households. 
10 It introduced the comprehensive property tax, heavier taxation on the capital gains on the real estate, and enforced real price transaction and 
mandatory registration of ownership of real estate. 
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percentage point of GDP, more than those of previous governments. In addition, taxation on real 
estate was loosened. In particular, Comprehensive Real Estate Holding Tax was literally paralyzed. 
The Park administration (2013~2017) made clear that it would maintain the tax policy of the 
previous government. With the promise of welfare without more tax, its tax reform has been 
limited to the reduction of tax expenditure; that is, tax base broadening. In particular, the Park 
government’s tax reform was the reduction of tax deductions given to the individual income tax, 
which triggered the anger of households struggling due to decreased income. Under the tax cut 
policy since 2008, the tax burden ratio excluding the social insurance has decreased as the direct 
taxes have decreased (Figure 4 and 5). The combination of the maintenance of a low tax burden 
ratio and the welfare expansion trend has deteriorated fiscal soundness in the backdrop of sluggish 
growth and a tax revenue deficient. The fiscal accounts excluding the social insurance have been 
in deficit with ever larger size. Government debt as a share of GDP has shown an increasing 
tendency since the year of 2003. The increase of government debt during 2003 to 2006 was 
attributable to the failure to recover the public funds poured into the banks in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis of 1998. Yet the increase since 2008 has been mainly due to the shortage of tax 
revenue (Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6. Genral government debt of Korea (as percentage of GDP) 
 
Source: Homepage of Ministry of Strategy and Finance of Korea 
 
IV. KOREAN FISCAL POLICY COMPARED WITH OTHER 
OECD COUNTRIES 
 
In order to find a desirable way of reforming the Korean fiscal system, we begin by comparing 
it to those of other OECD countries11. Above all, the Korean system has the features of a very low 
tax burden and small government expenditure size (table 2). The welfare expenditure is smaller 
than other groups as well. Scandinavian and Western European countries are two groups with high 
burden and high expenditure, but the latter relies more on social security contributions in its tax 
structure. The Anglo-Saxon group has a lower burden and lower expenditure than the other three 
groups while the Southern European group has a level of expenditure comparable to those of the 
Scandinavian and Western European countries but its burden level is lower. The three groups 
                                                 
11 In particular, we will distinguish four sub-groups of the eighteen advanced OECD countries and compare them with Korean fiscal system. This 
is expected to give us more significant implications. The four groups are Scandinavian, West European, Anglo-Saxon, and Southern groups, based 
on the classification of Castles (2004). The Scandinavian group includes Denmark Finland, Norway and Sweden, Anglo-Saxon groups includes 
Australia, Canada, Ireland, New-Zealand, U.K. and U.S., Western European group includes Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands, and Southern 
group includes Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. 
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excluding the Northern one have very high government debt. While even the Anglo-Saxon group 
spends around 50% of its total expenditure on the welfare, Korea spends around 30%. According 
to the estimation of Torres (2013), the actual tax revenue (excluding social insurance contributions) 
and government expenditure of Korea are lower than the expected revenue and expenditure which 
are estimated based on the country’s economic and demographic characteristics. The actual tax 
revenue and government expenditure (as a share of GDP) are lower than expected ones, –3.4 and 
9.5 percentage point of GDP respectively. One positive aspect of the Korean fiscal system is that 
the government debt is quite lower than in other groups. It is the result of implementation of strict 
fiscal rules by Korean governments.  
 
Table 2. Tax burden ratio, total expenditure and total debt size (2012) 
(Unit: as a percentage of GDP) 
 Tax burden 
excluding social 
insurance 
contributions 
Tax burden 
including social 
insurance 
contributions 
Total expenditure 
of central 
government 
Public social 
expenditure 
Total debt of 
central government 
Scandinavian 35.4 43.7 52.7 27.3 53.0 
Anglo-Saxon 25.8 29.3 41.3 20.1 100.1 
Western European 25.7 40.5 50.8 27.8 97.3 
Southern European 23.9 34.9 50.0 26.5 131.3 
Korea 18.7 24.8 32.7 9.6 34.7 
OECD average 24.7 33.7 45.0 21.6 83.7 
Source: www.oecd.org/statistics 
Note: Social expenditure includes health and social protection programs 
 
When the expenditure structure is compared in more detail, Korea is observed to spend more 
on national defense and economic programs and less on welfare programs than OECD averages(as 
shares of GDP). If Korea was to adjust the expenditure size of each program to the averages of 
OECD countries, it needs to reduce the economic program expenditure by 2 percentage point of 
GDP and increase the welfare program expenditure by more than 10 percentage point of GDP. 
Table 3 shows the size of each expenditure category as a share of GDP. If it is expressed as a share 
of total expenditure, the Korean government spent 20.1% of total expenditures into economic 
affairs while OECD countries spent 10.5% on average. 
 
Table 3. Expenditure structure of central government by function (2009)  
(Unit: as a percentage of GDP) 
 General 
public 
services 
Defense Public 
order and 
safety 
Economic 
affairs 
Environ- 
mental 
protection 
Recreation, 
culture and 
religion 
Education Social 
expen-
diture 
Scandinavian 6.7 1.5 1.3 4.2 0.4 1.3 6.6 29.5 
Anglo-Saxon 5.3 2.0 1.9 4.6 0.7 0.8 5.6 22.0 
Western European 6.5 1.3 1.8 4.8 1.0 1.3 5.6 28.0 
Southern European 8.9 1.6 2.0 4.0 0.7 0.9 4.9 25.6 
Japan 4.6 0.9 1.3 4.1 1.2 0.4 3.5 25.1 
Korea 4.9 2.8 1.3 6.5 0.8 0.7 5.1 9.1 
OECD 5.9 1.5 1.7 4.5 0.7 1.2 5.4 21.6 
Source: OECD, Statistics Database. 
Now let us turn to the tax system side. As Table 4 shows, the OECD countries vary in their 
tax revenue structures. The Scandinavian group has the highest levels of individual and corporate 
incomes taxes as well as consumption tax while its social insurance revenue size is slightly below 
the OECD average while still higher than that of Anglo-Saxon group. The Anglo-Saxon group 
gathers higher revenue in individual and corporate income taxes but is lower in consumption tax 
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and social insurance contributions than the OECD average. Interestingly, the ratios of individual 
income tax revenue to consumption tax revenue are same between these two groups and higher 
than the OECD average. By the way, the Western and Southern European countries are 
characterized by higher burden ratios of social insurance contributions while Western European 
group gathers much larger size of revenue from social insurance contributions than the Southern 
group. In the case of tax categories, the two groups are marked by lower tax revenue in income 
taxes than the other two groups. Reflecting the lower tax burden ratios, the Korean tax system is 
characterized by smaller tax revenue in individual income tax, consumption tax, and social 
insurance while it has higher tax revenues in consumption and property taxes than the OECD 
average. Among the three tax categories raising smaller revenue, the roles of the individual income 
tax and employer social insurance contribution are much weaker than the consumption tax and 
employee social insurance contribution. 
 
Table 4. Tax revenue structure including social insurance contributions (2012) 
(Unit: % of GDP) 
 Income tax Consumption tax Property tax Social insurance contributions 
Individual 
(A) 
corporate revenue 
(B) 
A/B total holding 
tax 
total employee employer 
Scandi-
navian 
14.6 4.6 13.4 1.1 1.3 0.8 7.9 2.4 5.5 
Anglo-
Saxon 
10.3 3.4 9.2 1.1 2.9 2.2 3.4 1.3 2.1 
Western 
European 
9.2 2.3 11.2 0.8 2.2 1.0 12.9 5.3 7.6 
Southern 
European 
7.9 2.2 11.4 0.7 2.0 1.1 9.8 3.0 6.8 
Korea 3.7 3.7 8.4 0.4 2.8 0.7 5.3 2.6 2.7 
OECD 
average 
8.6 2.9 11.0 0.8 1.8 1.1 8.4 3.3 5.1 
Source: www.oecd.org/statistics 
Note: Property tax incorporates the recurrent taxes on immovable property, recurrent taxes on net wealth, the estate, inheritance and 
gift taxes and financial transaction taxes. 
 
Table 5. Top marginal tax rates of major countries (2013) 
(Unit: % of GDP) 
 Individual 
income tax 
Corporate 
income tax 
VAT 
Standard rate 
Social insurance contributions 
total employee employer 
Sweden 56.7 22.0 25.0 38.42 7.00 31.42 
Denmark 60.4 25.0 25.0 8.00 8.00 0.00 
U.S 46.3 39.1 - 21.30 7.65 13.65 
U.K 45.0 23.0 22.0 25.80 12.00 13.80 
Germany 47.5 30.2 19.0 39.46 20.18 19.28 
France 54.5 34.4 19.6 55.53 13.80 41.73 
Greece 46.0 26.0 23.0 45.06 16.50 28.56 
Italy 48.6 27.5 21.0 42.57 10.49 32.08 
Japan 50.8 37.0 5.0 28.36 13.94 14.42 
Korea 41.8 24.2 10.0 18.50 8.29 10.23 
OECD 43.4 25.3 18.9 26.8 10.43 17.27 
Source: www.oecd.org/tax/tax-policy/tax-database.htm 
Note: 1) Individual and corporate income taxes are the sum of taxes imposed by the central and local governments’ 
taxes. 2) The U.S. does not levy VAT but rather sales tax at state and local governments 3) In the case of social 
insurance contribution with flat rate, that flat rate is considered as the top rate. 
Are these differences due to the tax rates? The table 5 shows the rate levels of different tax 
items. When we compare the top marginal tax rates between Korea and the OECD average, the 
rates of individual and corporate income taxes and employee social insurance contribution rate are 
not significantly lower than the OECD average while the standard VAT rate and employer social 
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insurance contribution rate are noticeably lower. While the size of social insurance revenues broadly 
reflect its rate level, other taxes need more explanation. 
In the case of individual income tax, tax revenue is quite small compared to other countries 
not because Korea has a very low statutory rates but because the Korean individual income tax is 
characterized mainly by excessively large tax relief measures. Generous tax relief measures are 
offered, which is one of the outstanding characteristics from the industrialization period. As 
standard tax reliefs, employment income deduction is offered to every households with decreasing 
rates for the high income households while other numerous allowances based on demographic 
composition of households, national pension deduction and tax credits are also offered. These tax 
reliefs are introduced to fully deduct the expenses from their income which households spent while 
earning income. In addition, non-standard tax reliefs are offered generously as well. Households 
can deduct from their income expenses such as insurance premiums, medical expenses, educational 
expenses, etc. The problem with this generous tax relief system is that it lowers the effective tax 
rates across all households and the value of tax reliefs often increases for higher tax brackets 
because the income or transaction targeted is most commonly used by higher-income individuals.  
 
Table 6. Tax revenue structure of wage income  
(Unit: trillion Korean Won, %) 
 Share in the 
total wage 
deductions share in the 
total tax 
revenue 
Effective tax 
rates amount 
(trillion won) 
share 
Top 1% 6.4 5.3 2.2 29.0 21.4 
10th quantile 27.8 43.2 17.8 65.9 11.2 
9th quantile 16.2 37.0 15.2 15.4 4.5 
8th quantile 12.8 32.7 13.5 8.1 3.0 
7th quantile 10.4 28.2 11.6 4.6 2.1 
6th quantile 8.6 24.2 9.9 2.6 1.4 
5th quantile 7.1 20.6 8.5 1.5 1.0 
4th quantile 5.8 17.7 7.3 0.9 0.8 
3rd quantile 4.7 15.5 6.4 0.6 0.6 
2nd quantile 3.7 13.4 5.5 0.3 0.4 
1st quantile 2.7 10.6 4.4 0.1 0.2 
total 100.0 243.1 100.0 100.0 7.0 
Source: Kang (2014) 
 
The tax revenue of both corporate income tax and property tax is higher than the OECD 
average. It is not because Korea imposes heavier taxes on two tax bases than other countries as we 
have already seen. In the case of corporate income tax, it is because the tax base itself is very large 
although the tax breaks are offered to corporations generously. Tax revenue has increased rapidly 
since the year 1999, mainly due to the increase of the tax base; that is, the increase of profit in the 
corporate sector. The table below shows that the tax base of the corporate tax income was 3.30% 
of GDP in 1981 but increased tremendously to 18.33% in 2012. The tax base of the corporate 
sector increased in other major countries, but Korea experienced the largest increase over the 
period. In the case of property tax, Korea received the property tax revenue much more than the 
OECD average by 1% of GDP in 2012. However, tax revenue of property holding tax is smaller 
than the OECD average while the revenue of financial transaction tax is dominant in this tax 
category.  
 
Table 7. Tax base of corporate income tax of OECD countries  
(Unit: percentage of GDP) 
 Korea U.K. U.S. Canada Japan 
Tax base of 1981* 3.30 5.63 7.52 8.11 9.45 
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Tax base of 2012** 18.33 12.08 6.40 13.37 8.79 
Source: Kim (2015) 
Note: 1982 for Korea, 2011 for the U.S. and Japan 
 
V. TAX SYSTEM REFORM FOR A NEW GROWTH REGIME 
 
The welfare program should be substantially expanded if Korea would like to transform into 
a wage and welfare-led growth model. Then, how should the tax system be reformed in order to 
support this transformation? The priority of tax policy for the current government is placed on the 
containment of the tax burden ratio at the current low level. The tax revenue required to implement 
the promised meager welfare expansion is intended to be financed mainly by the reduction of tax 
expenditure. Yet, the insufficient tax revenue has been an obstacle to the implementation of the 
promised welfare programs in full and even endangered Korea’s fiscal soundness. It is evident that 
the tax burden ratio should be substantially increased.  
The first question in designing the tax system reform is how to balance the roles played by 
each of the two pillars; that is, the tax system and the social insurance system. Currently, Korea 
relies mainly on the social insurance system for its welfare programs although its level of coverage 
is still weak compared to other OECD countries. The income replacement ratio of the public 
pension system is among the lowest in OECD countries. As for this question, the experiences of 
the advanced countries clearly showed that the social insurance system faced the sustainability 
problem when the economy entered the stage marked by mass unemployment and the proliferation 
of irregular workers. France, one of the representative social insurance-based counties has changed 
from a predominantly Bismarckian system to a dualized system where the taxing state emerged as 
an important actor with the social insurance system (Palier, 2010). In that Korea is marked by much 
more severe labor instability, the taxation should take stronger responsibility than so far.  
Then, how should the tax system be reformed in a way to raise more revenue without 
damaging the efficiency and the equity of the system? One option is to rely more on the indirect 
tax. A group of academics argue that the consumption tax is more efficient and faces less political 
resistance than the direct tax, being a good candidate for financing expansion of welfare 
program(Yang, 2015). Although the consumption tax is said to be regressive and could deteriorate 
the equity of tax system, the increased tax revenue, if it is used only for the expansion of the welfare 
program, would improve the equity of the whole system. Their argument is based on the fact that 
the advanced welfare states are highly financed by indirect taxes. One of the outstanding features 
observed in the changes of tax system of OECD countries from the 1980’s has been the rate cut 
of direct taxes. This change was observed also in the European countries where the leftist parties 
had taken power for a long time12. In addition to a rate cut of direct taxes, the Northern European 
countries in the grip of social democratic parties discarded the comprehensive income tax and 
adopted a double income tax system through a number of tax reforms from 1987 to 1993.  
Social-democratic countries that allegedly prioritize equity are expected to rely more on 
progressive direct taxes while market-based countries that allegedly prioritize efficiency rely on 
regressive indirect tax. Contrary to this expectation, social democratic countries have relied heavily 
on consumption tax more than liberal market countries, which is shown in the higher ratio of share 
in the indirect tax to the share tax in Sweden than in the United States. Recent studies pointed to 
the fact that the regressive tax amplified the taxing capability of a country and as a result contributed 
to the development of a welfare state. Steinmo (2003) concluded that the social democratic 
countries imposed a heavy tax burden on the whole income classes in order to mobilize massive 
                                                 
12 Spearheaded by the U.S. which started the tax reform based on the a “Broad Base-Low Rate” approach and low rate in the middle of the 1980’s, 
the advanced countries has competitively reduced the tax rates of the direct taxes. 
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amount of tax revenue and then poured that tax revenue into housing, education, health, and 
welfare programs. This fiscal policy has been more successful in improving income distribution 
than a combination of progressive tax systems and mediocre welfare programs. In the same vein, 
Kato (2003) argued that the countries expanding their funding base though the VAT in the early 
postwar period could not only develop welfare state earlier than others but also could maintain 
their high level of welfare in the subsequent period the welfare-state was brought under intensive 
censure due to the economic depression. 
Should Korea increase the role of consumption tax before others following these experiences? 
The answer should be no. It is true that social democratic countries had increased its dependence 
on the consumption tax at an early period of welfare state and continued to increase its role steadily 
at least until the end of 1980’s. But the burden of their direct taxes has become already very high 
when they decided to increase the role of indirect taxes. Accordingly, the share of individual income 
tax is still the highest among OECD countries and the share of individual income tax is larger than 
the share of consumption tax. That is, social democratic countries should not give up the 
progressivity of their tax systems. It is true that the tax rate is high for all brackets; that is, even for 
low-income households.  
 
Figure 7. Redistributive impacts of household taxes and public cash and transfers Point reduction in the 
concentration coefficients, in the late 2000’s 
 
Source: Joumard, Pisu and Bloch (2012)  
 
Figure 7 shows the redistributive impacts of household taxes and public cash transfers of 
OECD countries13. The U.S. has a higher impact of household taxes and a lower impact of public 
transfer than the average while Sweden has a slightly lower impact of taxes and a higher impact of 
public cash transfers. However, in terms of combined impact, that of Sweden is higher than the 
U.S., which serves as evidence of the relevance of the intensified role of the consumption tax. Cash 
transfers reduce income dispersion more than taxes in most OECD countries. On average, three 
quarters of the reduction in inequality as between market and disposable income are due to 
transfers, the rest to taxes. When we look at the impacts shown by other social democratic countries, 
however, they have as high redistributive impact of taxes as the U.S. does. Incidentally, Korea 
shows extremely low redistributive impacts in both areas. If Korea would like to improve the 
                                                 
13 Household tax includes the personal income tax, social security contributions, and property taxes. Public cash and transfers include the one 
regarding old age, incapacity, family unemployment, and other social policy areas. 
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redistributive effects of its fiscal system, it should make efforts in both directions. In this situation, 
if Korea increases the consumption taxes, the improvement of redistributive impact of household 
taxes would be realized. 
 
Figure 8. Characteristics of household taxes 
 
Source: Joumard, Pisu, and Bloch (2012)  
 
Then how could we increase the redistributive impact of the household tax? The comparison 
of the features of household taxes in OECD countries gives us some hints. The graph shows that 
there is a trade-off between two features of the household tax system: the higher progressivity a 
household tax has, the lower tax revenue it has. It is notable that the countries above the line are 
broadly the countries characterized by higher redistributive impact of tax in the graph above. It 
means that if Korea would like to enhance the redistributive impact of taxes, the most reasonable 
way is to increase both progressivity and tax revenue at the same time.14 To achieve this goal, the 
effective tax rates of high income households should be raised and the effective tax rates of low 
income households should be lowered. Yet the former should be larger than the latter. On the side 
of high income earners, it can be done by raising the top rate or reducing the tax expenditure for 
the top income class. Tax expenditures pertaining to personal income tax tend to benefit the well-
off, a main exception being in-work tax credits. On the side of low income earners, tax relief can 
be made more generous so as to reduce the cost of labor of groups at high unemployment risk and 
earned income tax credit can be raised to make work more attractive for low-income earners. 
Another way of pursuing the two goals at the same time is to reform the capital income tax 
and property tax have long been considered as inequitable and harmful to fair taxation. Capital 
incomes such as the interest, dividend, and capital gains are still not subject to complete 
comprehensive taxation. The combined amount of interest and dividend less than 20 million won 
is subject to a withholding taxation, not to the comprehensive taxation. Capital gains on the stocks 
of listed companies are exempt from tax in most cases and a handful of cases is subject to taxation. 
In the case of capital gains on real estate, a generous exemption is provided as well. The tax 
                                                 
14 . If Korea relies only on the expansion of tax revenue, it would means a drastic incease in the household tax burden. 
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exemption measures for capital incomes should be eliminated and capital gains should be subject 
to comprehensive taxation. The same goes for the property holding tax. Generous exemption 
measures should be reduced. As most beneficiaries of this unequitable taxation are high income 
households, proposed reform would surely improve the progressivity of the tax and raise revenue. 
An unfair tax system encourages tax avoidance and causes tax resistance, which creates inefficiency 
in tax enforcement.  
Before the increase in the role of regressive consumption tax, the corporate income tax should 
be intensified as well. As we already examined, Korean income distribution is highly distorted to 
the advantage of corporations. Despite this trend, tax payment by corporations has decreased 
notably, which is evident from the Table 8. Indeed, the effective tax rates of corporate income tax 
has declined since 2008 due to the drastic tax cut policy. Furthermore, the largest companies that 
have paid tax at a lower rate in effective terms though the statutory marginal rate have been the 
highest. It was because they have been the main beneficiary of tax relief offered for R&D activities 
or investment.  
 
Table 8. Effective tax rates of corporate income tax by corporate size 
(Unit: %) 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
All 20.5 19.6 16.6 16.6 16.8 
Large 21.6 21.0 17.7 17.6 17.8 
The 10 largest 18.7 16.3 11.4 13.0 13.0 
The 100 largest 20.9 20.4 16.7 16.8 17.5 
SMEs 17.2 15.3 13.1 13.2 13.3 
Note: effective tax rates=(corporate tax payment/ tax base)*100.  
10 largest and 100 largest companies are selected by sales size of 2012.  
Source: Kang (2015). 
 
Will the intensification of direct taxes mean an increase of inefficiently? Theoretically, the 
increase of individual and corporate income taxes are said to damage the economic efficiency in 
that the household would decrease the labor supply and corporations would decrease investment, 
which reduces the production and employment in turns. However, most empirical studies of the 
impact of two income taxes on the Korean economy found that efficiency loss is marginal. The 
studies regards the impact of individual income tax on the labor supply (Kim and Sung, 2007; Nam, 
2007; Nam·Chun·Lee·Ki, 2009; Kang and Sung, 2013) showed that after-tax wage rate did not 
have statically significant impact or if it had, the size is very small. Concerning the impact of the 
corporate income tax on the investment, the studies have shown broadly comparable results (Lee 
and Kim, 2004; Kim W.C, 2007; Sung and Kang, 2008).  
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
Although Korea has increased welfare programs rapidly since 1998, the income redistributive 
effect through fiscal system is still low compared to the other OECD countries. Considering this, 
a small-scale welfare expansion cannot be a solution for a Korean economy suffering low growth 
and severe inequality. On the one hand, welfare expenditures should be significantly amplified if 
Korea would like to change its economic model to a wage or welfare-led model. In effect, the 
welfare expenditure size is very small when the economic development and the ageing level are 
taken into consideration. On the other hand, the tax system marked by an important role of social 
insurance system and an unfairly structured tax structure should be reformed to increase the 
revenue of direct taxes in a way to enhance tax fairness.  
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In the case of the social insurance system, it would be difficult and undesirable to take an 
essential role in the welfare system when the extremely dualized labor market is considered. In the 
tax system, the intensification of the consumption tax is not a good option even if it would bring 
a large amount of revenue probably without strong political resistance. It is because the income 
redistributive effects are so small that the Korean fiscal system should be reformed to enhance it 
through both the tax and expenditure system for the time being. The experiences of OECD 
countries showed that the indirect taxes took a more active role just after the direct taxes had been 
maximized. The intensification of corporate income tax for large corporations, property holding 
tax, capital income taxes, and taxation on high income households should be on the tax reform 
agenda before other options. However, tax fairness itself is not the ultimate goal of tax system 
reform. Accordingly, this tax reform should be followed sooner or later by the goal of the increase 
in tax revenue enough to support welfare expansion. Then the intensification of consumption tax 
will be a good option.  
The upcoming presidential election of 2017 will be critical for the future of the Korean 
economy. The main opposing progressive party recently adopted the slogan of “wage-led growth 
policy” supported by a medium-welfare and medium-burden fiscal policy. The civil society has 
been strongly promoting the strategy of the wage and welfare-led growth model and asking for an 
increase in the tax revenue through adopting a fairer tax system. However, the trade unions have 
been focused more on the issues related directly to the maintenance of the regular workers’ rights 
because it comprises mostly of insider workers. If this alternative economic model is to be strongly 
pushed forward, the trade unions have to be involved in this movement. However, an important 
question remains: will this alternative succeed in appealing to Koreans? Nobody can easily say yes. 
The traditional economic model is still strongly influencing Koreans’ attitudes which argues that 
the best welfare is to give jobs, which can be attained with more freedom to the enterprises and 
markets15. While Korea is indeed at a crossroads, the progressive bloc has not yet found a break-
through toward paradigm change. 
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